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One hallmark of successful scholarship is its ability to take a 
seemingly outrageous proposition and make it seem obvious. By 
this standard, Steven D. Smith's Foreordained Failure: The Quest 
for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom is a success. 
Professor Smith advances two such propositions: first, that the 
Constitution's framers envisioned the religion clauses not as sub-
stantive provisions, but as a single jurisdictional provision 
designed to leave the substance of religious freedom to the 
states; and second, that an adequate substantive theory of reli-
gious freedom is impossible. Smith's claims run against the grain 
of virtually all modern church-state theory. Nonetheless, he 
makes a compelling case for both propositions. 
Part I of this Review discusses Foreordained Failure's histori-
cal argument-that the First Amendment embodies no substan-
tive principle of religious liberty. I argue that even if Smith is 
right to conclude that the primary purpose of the religion clauses 
was jurisdictional, this conclusion does not obviate the need to 
determine the clauses' substantive scope. Jurisdiction is a syno-
nym for authority, and someone must still determine what Con-
gress lacks jurisdiction to do. 
Part II addresses Smith's second, more theoretical argu-
ment-that a general theory of religious freedom is impossible. 
Upon examination, it is clear that what Smith is really arguing is 
that a genuinely "neutral" theory of religious freedom is impossi-
ble. But even if perfect neutrality is elusive, it does not follow 
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that the project of theorizing about religious liberty is hopeless. 
Rather, Smith's argument suggests we might reconsider when 
neutrality is possible and whether it is a proper objective of our 
religion clause jurisprudence. 
Part III briefly explores a few of the broader implications 
and ironies of Smith's two theses. 
I. SMITH'S HISTORICAL ARGUMENT: THE 
"ESSENTIAL FEDERALISM" OF THE 
RELIGION CLAUSES 
Smith's historical argument begins with a claim few judges 
and scholars would dispute: that the religion clauses were "an 
exercise in federalism." (p. 18) Many have commented on the 
religion clauses' federalist character, (p. 18 nn.4 & 5 (collecting 
authorities)) and as many others have observed the difficulties 
attending their incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment.3 
The problem, says Smith, is the "virtually ubiquitous" assump-
tion "that the religion clauses contain both a federalist element 
and a substantive principle or right and that their substantive 
content can be extracted and elaborated independently of the 
clauses' federalism." (p. 18) (emphasis added) For Smith, this 
"dualistic view of the religion clauses" is mistaken. "The religion 
clauses," he argues, "were not a hybrid creation-part federal-
ism, part substantive right. They were, rather, simply an assign-
ment of jurisdiction over matters of religion to the states-no 
more, no less." (p. 18) 
In advancing this argument, Smith suggests it is helpful to 
remember that the founders grappled with two sorts of questions. 
The first sort of question-"What is the proper relation between 
religion and government?"-might be thought of as "first-order" 
or "substantive." Smith terms this inquiry the "'religion ques-
tion."' The second sort of question-"Which level of govern-
ment, state or national, should be responsible for addressing the 
first-order question?"-might be thought of as a "second-order" 
question. Smith calls it the "'jurisdiction question.'" (p. 19) 
The rest, Smith says, is simply history. It is common knowl-
edge that the founders' views on the religion question were di-
3. In the Postscript to Chapter Four, Smith briefly discusses how the adoption of 
the Fourteenth Amendment bears on his conclusions. (50-54) For an argument that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was intended in part to extend the substantive protections of the 
First Amendment, see Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: 
Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1106, 1145-56 
(1994). 
1997] BOOK REVIEWS 367 
vergent: some, motivated by a perception that religion was vital 
to orderly society, deemed government support for religion de-
sirable;4 (pp. 19-20) others, motivated by the same perception, 
opposed such support for fear that it would undermine true reli-
gious devotion.s (p. 20) Still others may have opposed support 
for religion, albeit less openly, on the ground that religion was 
unhelpful or detrimental to society. In short, the founders funda-
mentally disagreed over the proper relation between religion and 
government, yet the religion clauses passed with relatively little 
debate. Smith attributes this to the fact that the founders' diver-
gence on the religion question prompted their convergence on 
the jurisdiction question. Adopting a purely jurisdictional First 
Amendment promised the best of all worlds: each state could an-
swer the religion question however it saw fit.6 
This is certainly a plausible interpretation of the historical 
debate preceding the First Amendment's adoption.7 One may 
attribute the substantive views of a certain founder or founders 
to the religion clauses, but no one may reasonably argue that 
there was complete consensus on matters of church and state. 
Smith simply infers from this lack of consensus that the founders 
resolved their dilemma by agreeing to disagree. Although the 
lack of historical evidence makes it impossible to verify his hy-
pothesis, it is easy to imagine the perceived appeal of deferring 
all matters of religion and government to the states, where each 
framer had a much greater chance of seeing his own perspective 
prevail. Indeed, the very absence of recorded debate on the is-
4. Smith suggests that the drafters of the Massachusetts Constitution and Yale 
President Timothy Dwight were among those who supported this position. 
5. Smith places dissenting religious groups such as Baptists, and statesmen such as 
James Madison, among those who embraced this "voluntarist" position. 
6. Thus, Smith discounts originalism neither because it is impossible to ascertain 
the original meaning of the religion clauses nor because it would be useless to do so. 
Rather, he assumes both that their purpose is ascertainable and that knowing it would be 
useful. The problem, Smith says, is that "we can discern what was probably their essential 
meaning, and when we do so we discover that the religion clauses were purely jurisdic-
tional in nature; they did not adopt any substantive right or principle of religious free-
dom." (p. 17) 
7. It is not, however, the only plausible view. It is true that the fact that the First 
Amendment would apply only to the federal government simplified the debate, because 
those legislators who wanted to retain governmental power to do what the amendment 
forbad knew that the amendment would not limit their state governments. But it does 
not follow that the amendment has no substantive content, or even that the debate was 
not principally about substantive content. Significantly, the limited recorded debate on 
the Establishment Clause was about the meaning of establishment, not about the meaning 
of federalism. People on both sides took the same position with respect to federal estab-
lishment that they took at home with respect to state establishments. See generally 
Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original In-
tent, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 875, 906-10 (1986). 
368 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 14:365 
sue makes Smith's argument all the more plausible.s Would the 
founders readily have agreed to embodying a particular relation 
of church and state in the Constitution without putting up a fight 
for their own views? Hardly. 
Smith's argument nonetheless invites certain responses. 
First, it is hard to deny that the decision to leave substantive mat-
ters to the states was itself a substantive decision. Rephrasing the 
religion clauses, interpreted as a jurisdictional provision, eluci-
dates this point. 
• Congress may neither establish religion nor prohibit its free 
exercise. 
• States may both establish religion and prohibit its free 
exercise. 
Read together, these clauses suggest an interaction of religion 
and government in which the states have exclusive authority over 
religion. Read independently, however, these clauses suggest a 
relation of church and state in which religion is at once both ame-
nable to and immune from government legislation. Considered 
separately, the two provisions embody diametrically opposite 
substantive positions on the proper relation between church and 
state. Whereas the first clause contemplates a society in which 
the government's power over religion is circumscribed, the sec-
ond clause contemplates a society in which the government is 
free to foster or fetter religion as deemed desirable. In other 
words, we might say the founders adopted not one jurisdictional 
provision, but two substantive provisions. Read as one provision, 
it may be more natural to focus on the religion clauses' jurisdic-
tional character; read as two provisions, their substantive attrib-
utes become quite clear. Thus, even accepting Smith's reading of 
history, it is not entirely accurate to say the framers adopted a 
"purely" jurisdictional provision. 
Moreover, Smith fails to address the implications of his con-
clusion that the religion clauses are "purely" jurisdictional in na-
ture.9 Assuming he is correct, it follows that courts should be 
8. According to Smith, "if the enactors believed that they were not answering the 
difficult questions at all but were merely deferring those questions to someone else-the 
states-then the complacent and lackluster character of the discussion is entirely under· 
standable." (p. 27) Judges and scholars have erred, he maintains, by resorting to "a two-
step interpretive process. The first step has been to identify evidence of what one or more 
of the framers or their contemporaries said or thought, not necessarily about the religion 
clauses per se, but about the subject of religious freedom. The second step has been to 
superimpose this opinion or view about religious freedom onto the religion clauses." (p. 
46) 
9. Although he acknowledges in Chapter 3 that "even a purely jurisdictional mea-
sure will necessarily impose substantive restrictions on one level of government to ensure 
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able to interpret them correctly simply by applying basic princi-
ples of federal preemption law-in reverse. Under Smith's inter-
pretation, that is, the religion clauses preclude the federal 
government from acting in any manner that interferes with ple-
nary state power over religion. This conclusion, however, raises 
several questions Smith fails to answer: If the federal government 
possesses no power over religion except that left to it by the 
states, what constitutes an interference with state power? Are 
there times when state measures impliedly "preempt" federal 
legislation "respecting" religion?w If the states fail to "occupy 
the field" and adopt a "hands off" approach as to matters of reli-
gion, is Congress free to legislate as it pleases?u 
Suppose, for example, an early Congress enacted a draft 
pursuant to its power to raise an army. Further suppose it 
drafted clergymen and conscientious objectors such as Quakers. 
In one respect Congress would simply be exercising its power 
over federal military matters, but in another respect Congress 
would be exercising jurisdiction over religion by forcing such 
draftees to violate their religious obligations. Exempting clergy-
men and conscientious objectors would simply create a different 
problem. At one level Congress would not be exercising jurisdic-
tion over religion, but at another level Congress would be adopt-
ing an explicitly religious classification. Suppose an early 
Congress subjected federal law to the requirements of the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).12 Would any of these 
enactments be constitutional? 
In sum, Smith's conclusion that the religion clauses were pri-
marily jurisdictional in nature does not obviate the need to deter-
mine their substantive scope. Rather, it simply creates new 
interpretive questions; for even if one accepts that the religion 
clauses have "no substantive meaning independent of their feder-
alism," one must still determine their substantive meaning in 
light of their federalism, and it remains the case that Congress 
that the substantive area is left to a different level of government," (p. 43) Smith fails to 
explore in any depth where those jurisdictional boundaries lie. 
10. Cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Develop· 
ment Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (state law can be preempted by congressional 
occupation of a given field, which preempts any state law within the field, or, if Congress 
has not occupied the field, state law is still preempted to the extent it actually conflicts 
with federal law). 
11. Cf. Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,256 (1984) (preemption should 
be judged "on whether there is an irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state 
standard or whether the imposition of a state standard ... would frustrate the objectives 
of federal law"). 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993). The Supreme Court recently invalidated RFRA as 
applied to the states. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). 
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may "make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. "13 In order to ensure that 
Congress makes no law "respecting" religious establishments or 
"prohibiting" religious free exercise, courts must first define 
what it means to establish religion and to prohibit its free exer-
cise. Then, and only then, can it enforce the jurisdictional limits 
on Congress' power. Thus, if we follow Smith's argument to its 
logical conclusion, it leads us back to square one and to his first-
order question: What is the proper relation between religion and 
government? 
II. SMITH'S THEORETICAL ARGUMENT: THE 
IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFECT NEUTRALITY 
The second half of Foreordained Failure is devoted to 
Smith's theoretical argument. An adequate general theory of 
religious freedom is not possible, he argues, because all such the-
ories founder on the following "basic theoretical conundrum": 
The function of a theory of religious freedom is to mediate 
among a variety of competing religious and secular positions 
and interests, or to explain how government ought to deal with 
these competing positions and interests. To perform that func-
tion, however, the theory will tacitly but inevitably privilege, 
or prefer in advance, one of those positions while rejecting or 
discounting others. But a theory that privileges one of the 
competing positions and rejects others a priori is not truly a 
theory of religious freedom at ali-or, at least, it is not the sort 
of theory that modern proponents of religious freedom have 
sought to develop. (p. 63) (emphasis added) 
At first glance, it appears that the final phrase in this passage 
is sort of an afterthought. As one reads on, however, it becomes 
clear that it is central to Smith's thesis. That is, Smith is not sim-
ply contending that the idea of a theory of religious freedom is 
impossible. Such theories abound and are ready subjects of criti-
cism. Rather, Smith is arguing that a genuinely neutral theory of 
13. A review of the 28 free exercise cases decided by the Supreme Court since 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), which incorporated the Free Exercise 
Clause, reveals that 13 (roughly 46%) involved challenges to federal law and 15 involved 
challenges to state laws. A review of the 51 establishment cases decided since Everson v. 
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947}, which incorporated the Establishment Clause, reveals 
that seven (roughly 14%} involved challenges to federal law and 44 involved challenges to 
state law. 
Ironically, if the religion clauses were in fact intended as a purely jurisdictional mea-
sure, incorporating them into the Fourteenth Amendment not only distorted their origi-
nal meaning, but "effectively repudiated-and hence repealed" them. (p. 49) 
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religious freedom is not possible-a conclusion that, he contends, 
necessarily renders the entire notion of a comprehensive and ad-
equate theory of religious freedom incoherent. As the author 
states in a later passage: 
[T]heories of religious freedom seek to reconcile or to mediate 
among competing religious and secular positions within a soci-
ety, but those competing positions disagree about the very 
background beliefs on which a theory of religious freedom 
must rest. One religion will maintain beliefs about theology, 
government, and human nature that may support a particular 
version of religious freedom. A different religion or a secular 
viewpoint will support different background beliefs that logi-
cally generate different views or theories of religious freedom. 
In adopting a theory of religious freedom that is consistent 
with some background beliefs but not with others, therefore, 
government ... must adopt, or privilege, one of the competing 
secular or religious positions. Yet this adopting or prefering of 
one religious or secular position over its competitors is pre-
cisely what modern theories of religious freedom seek to 
avoid. Hence, theories of religious freedom can function only 
by implicitly betraying their own objective. (p. 68) (emphasis 
added) 
In Smith's terminology, all theories of religious freedom imper-
missibly grant certain religious or secular perspectives a "pre-
ferred position." (p. 71) Accordingly, in one-by-one fashion he 
dismisses the various modem theories of religious libertyi4 on 
the ground that they "tacitly but inevitably ... prefer in advance" 
(p. 63) one or more "beliefs concerning matters of religion and 
theology, the proper role of government, and 'human nature,'" 
(p. 63) (footnote omitted) and thus "implicitly betray[] their own 
objective" (p. 68) of treating those perspectives neutrally. 
Smith's observations about neutrality are unlike most other 
discussions of the subject. Theorists too many to number have 
criticized this or that theory of religious freedom on the ground 
that it unduly burdens or favors a certain religion or religion in 
general. Apparently Smith has no quarrel with most of these 
theorists, for much of what he says is perfectly consistent with 
their criticisms. Yet Smith goes well beyond the claim that cer-
tain individual theories are, as applied, unfaithful to their de-
14. In Chapter Seven, entitled The Pursuit of Neutrality, Smith critiques seven such 
theories on the ground that they fail the test of true neutrality: Neutral Application (pp. 
78-7~); Neutrality as Nondiscrimination (pp. 79-81); Secularism as Neutrality (pp. 81-84); 
A Tnchotomy of Values (pp. 84-88); The "Common Denominator" Approach (pp. 88-90); 
Symbolic Neutrality (pp. 90-93); and Neutrality as a Matter of Degree (pp. 93-96). 
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dared objective of neutrality. He instead focuses on an entirely 
different respect in which theories of religious freedom are non-
neutral-at the level of their "selection of background beliefs or 
premises." (p. 99) Because the very assumptions upon which 
any theory of religious liberty will rest-no matter what those 
assumptions are-inevitably grant priority status to some concep-
tion of religion, Smith postulates that such theories necessarily 
cannot achieve neutrality. In short, he advances the more far-
reaching claim that neutrality is simply impossible, and reasons 
that generating and applying theories of religious freedom is 
therefore a hopeless enterprise that should be abandoned.Is 
To respond adequately to Smith's theoretical argument 
would require more than a book review, so I intend only to sug-
gest some of the limits of his theory in the form of two questions. 
The first question-Is Neutrality Possible?-inquires whether 
Smith's theoretical argument is descriptively accurate. The sec-
ond question-Is Neutrality Desirable?-explores the normative 
implications of his argument, namely, if neutrality isn't possible, 
or at least isn't possible in all circumstances, is that necessarily a 
bad thing? 
Question One: Is Neutrality Possible? 
As a descriptive matter, Smith's theoretical argument has 
much to commend it. Assumptions about human nature, about 
the proper role of religion in society, and about the legitimate 
scope of government clearly inform every theory of religious lib-
erty. As Smith observes, such theories are not created "ex 
nihilo."I6 (p. 63) Rather, their effectiveness depends upon the 
validity of the background assumptions upon which they rest.I7 
To cite an easy example, a theory that assumes religious persua-
sion is a matter of one's free will is of questionable validity from 
the perspective of those who understand themselves as 
predestined to hold their religious worldview and act in accord-
ance therewith.1s 
15. Smith advances this claim primarily in Chapters Five and Nine (the Afterward). 
16. Smith states that "an account of religious freedom that was simply asserted and 
not justified by reference to supporting premises would be mere fiat, and hence could 
hardly be counted as a theory at all." (p. 67) 
17. Cf. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 115, 188 (1992) ("[I]n the context of government speech-unlike regulation and 
spending-neutrality is an unattainable ideal. Whenever the government communicates 
to the people, it will favor some ideas and oppose others." (footnote omitted)). 
18. Cf. id. at 125 ("It would come as some surprise to a devout Jew to find that he 
has 'selected the day of the week in which to refrain from labor,' since the Jewish people 
have been under the impression for some 3,000 years that this choice was made by God." 
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Smith is also correct to suggest that theories of religious 
freedom that aspire toward neutrality are likely to betray that 
objective in practice. A theory of formal neutrality, for example, 
will likely grant a "preferred position" to mainstream religions, 
just as a theory that contemplates exemptions from generally ap-
plicable laws will likely grant a preferred position to those 
outside the mainstream. Indeed, virtually any government act to-
ward religion may be characterized as non-neutral in some re-
spect. Whether an observer perceives a particular state action as 
neutral will simply depend upon the vantage point, or baseline,19 
she adopts. Consider, for example, the variety of public reactions 
to the Court's decisions on teaching evolution in the schools. 
Those whose religious beliefs are contrary to the theory of evolu-
tion understandably perceive its being taught in the public 
schools as hostile to their beliefs. Yet those whose beliefs are 
contrary to the teachings of creationism would be equally justi-
fied in perceiving its addition to the curriculum, if that were per-
mitted, as hostile to their beliefs. Cases involving public use of 
religious symbols, such as a creche or menorah, illustrate the 
same point. The state's use of such symbols may reasonably be 
perceived as an endorsement of religion. Yet court decisions re-
quiring their removal from public places may reasonably be per-
ceived as government disapproval of religion.zo (p. 114) In 
short, whether a government act is neutral toward religion is rel-
ative, and it is unrealistic to suppose that government can be neu-
tral toward religion in every respect. 
But to say that neutrality is sometimes illusory is not to say 
that it is always illusory. And although Smith persuasively ar-
gues that neutrality is often elusive, he ignores important aspects 
of current doctrine that can and do avoid privileging certain reli-
gious positions from the outset. Neutrality-even at the level of 
background beliefs and assumptions-is possible in limited cir-
cumstances, and these circumstances indicate that Smith is wrong 
{footnote omitted) {quoting Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring)). 
19. Cf. Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 68-92 (Harv. U. Press, 1993); Douglas 
Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by 
Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 3 {1986); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, 
and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 993, 1002 {1990); Mc-
Connell, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 155, 173-79 (cited in note 17). 
20. "The Court simply takes no account ... of the alienation ... that many persons 
~eel toward a government that they perceive as indifferent or hostile to religion, and that 
1s hkely to be aggravated by the results of the 'no endorsement' version of religious free-
dom." (footnote omitted). (p. 114) 
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to say neutrality is always an unattainable goal. I offer just one 
by way of illustration. 
Consider a well-established principle of the Supreme 
Court's free exercise doctrine, namely that courts may pass on 
the sincerity, but not on the validity, of a claimant's religious doc-
trine.zt Several background assumptions inform this principle. 
One such assumption is that courts are ill-equipped to act as au-
thorities in spiritual matters; another is that, even if judges were 
competent theologians, religious belief is sufficiently important 
that people are entitled to form their own religious opinions, 
even if they seem wrongheaded to the government or to the ma-
jority of society. In consequence, the proper meaning and scope 
of religious belief is left to the claimant.22 
Whatever its merits, this aspect of church-state "theory" 
does not grant a "preferred position" to a particular conception 
of religion. Rather, it avoids precisely that difficulty by deferring 
the role of defining the proper scope of religious belief to the 
claimant. As a result, the state is limited to determining when 
the interests of the community are more important than the 
claimant's interest in the free exercise of her faith. Although this 
sort of balancing burdens some religious claimants more than 
others, and thus is not neutral in application, it is neutral in the 
sense of the word that Smith finds unattainable. 
This aspect of current doctrine does not form a complete 
theory of religious liberty, but it demonstrates that Smith goes 
too far in arguing that the "background assumptions" upon 
which all theories of religious liberty rest can never be neutral. 
But even assuming neutrality is never attainable, does it neces-
sarily follow that the entire notion of a theory of religious free-
dom is incoherent? The answer must be "No"-unless, of course, 
neutrality is the underlying purpose of the religion clauses, and 
21. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) ("Courts are not arbi-
ters of scriptural interpretation. The narrow function of a reviewing court in this context is 
to determine whether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner terminated his 
work because of an honest conviction that such work was forbidden by his religion."). 
22. For an insightful discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of this aspect of the 
Court's doctrine, see Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 S. Ct. 
Rev. I, 15: 
[R]eligious claims-if true-are prior to and of greater dignity than the claims of 
the state. If there is a God, His authority necessarily transcends the authority of 
nations; that, in part, is what we mean by 'God.' For the state to maintain that its 
authority is in all matters supreme would be to deny the possibility that a tran-
scendent authority could exist. Religious claims thus differ from secular moral 
claims both because the state is constitutionally disabled from disputing the 
truth of the religious claim and because it cannot categorically deny the author-
ity on which such a claim rests. 
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not simply an approximation for achieving a more fundamental 
purpose such as the separation of church and state, the establish-
ment of a secular public order, or the accommodation of religion. 
Smith apparently assumes that neutrality is the driving force be-
hind the religion clauses, for when he concludes that neutrality is 
unattainable, he declares that theorizing about religious liberty 
must be abandoned.23 
Question Two: Is Neutrality Desirable? 
Smith rightly observes that many modem theories of reli-
gious liberty-and the Supreme Court's own religion clause doc-
trine-aspire toward "neutrality."24 (p. 77) Indeed, the term 
itself seems to have become the mantra of the religion clauses. 
Thus, it is somewhat disconcerting to think that neutrality might 
not even be possible, and Smith's contentions at first appear 
quite damning. 
Upon further reflection, however, it is somewhat surprising 
that "neutrality" has become the byword of the religion clauses. 
The First Amendment itself singles out religion from other phi-
losophies and ideologies,2s and few take seriously the proposition 
that government may not in any way take religion qua religion 
into account, either for special advantage or disadvantage.26 At 
times religion is entitled to special protection; at times it is placed 
at an apparent disadvantage. The issue, therefore, is not whether 
government may take religion into account, but when, how, and 
for what purposes. If being "neutral" toward religion means that 
the government must always treat it like everything else, then 
23. Smith assumes that in making the case against perfect neutrality, he has also 
made the case for abandoning neutrality entirely. In so doing, he commits the fallacy of 
the excluded middle. The more sensible third alternative, of course, is to redefine neutral-
ity so that it reinforces and implements liberty. See Laycock, 39 DePaul L. Rev. at 1001-
02 (cited in note 19} (defining "substantive neutrality" as minimizing incentives to change 
religious behavior); Michael W. McConnell and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Ap-
proach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1989) (advocating a similar 
approach in economic terms). 
24. Quoting Philip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Doc-
trine, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 817,818 (1984) ("That in some sense the federal government and the 
states ought to be 'neutral' in religious matters is undisputed."). 
25. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (White, J., dissenting) ("It cannot 
be ignored that the First Amendment itself contains a religious classification."). 
26. See generally Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitu-
tion, 1983 S. Ct. Rev. 83; Michael W. McConnell, A Response to Professor Marshall, 58 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 329, 331-32 (1991). 
[T]he Constitution treats religious belief differently-sometimes better, some-
times worse, depending on whether the context is one of interference or ad-
vancement. The unifying principle is that the religious life of the people should 
be _insulated, to the maximum possible degree, from the effect of governmental 
actton, whether favorable or unfavorable. To extend this principle to all other 
beliefs and activities would be impossible. 
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making neutrality the focus of religion clause doctrine is plainly 
both undesirable and doctrinally mistaken. 
Unfortunately, Smith perpetuates the mistaken assumption 
that neutrality is the be-all, end-all of the relation of church and 
state, rather than a commonly useful means of promoting the end 
of religious liberty. As Michael McConnell has observed, "[i]t is 
sometimes forgotten that religious liberty is the central value and 
animating purpose of the Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment. "27 Neutrality, like the principle of separation, is no more 
than an approximation for religious liberty: sometime it advances 
religious liberty, less often it does not, but it is not a substitute 
for maximizing religious liberty. Accordingly, it may sometimes 
be desirable to deviate from the goal of neutrality to achieve the 
more fundamental purpose of advancing religious freedom.zs 
And if violations of neutrality are "precisely what modem theo-
ries of religious freedom seek to avoid," (p. 68) perhaps the theo-
rists ought to rethink their objective. 
III 
If the First Amendment embodies no substantive principle 
of religious freedom, and if the very enterprise of generating 
such a principle is incoherent, American judges and scholars 
have indeed embarked on a "hopeless quest," (p. 120) and 
Smith's book is aptly entitled Foreordained Failure. Yet one 
might ask, "Where does that leave us?" 
Smith avoids offering anything more than "general and very 
tentative" (p. vi) conjectures about such questions, noting that 
the objective of the book is not "to answer normative questions," 
but simply "to clarify our situation by trying to explore the na-
ture and sources of our current confusion." (p. 121) Accord-
ingly, he suggests only that such normative questions will be 
"troublesome" until we reconsider the basis of "two background 
assumptions" that inform our current system: first, "that judicial 
review must be based on something called 'principle"'; and sec-
ond, "that the courts necessarily have an essential and central 
role to play in the realization and protection of religious free-
dom." (p. 122) 
27. McConnell, 1985 S. Ct. Rev. at 1 (cited in note 22). 
28. Alternatively, we might simply redefine neutrality so that it maximizes religious 
freedom. See note 23, supra. Because the term is malleable, however, and because the 
courts have not adhered to a consistent definition of neutrality, it may be more desirable 
simply to abandon the term altogether. 
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One of the ironies in Smith's modest stated objective is that 
the normative implications of his arguments are anything but 
modest. Not only does rethinking these two assumptions follow 
naturally from Smith's arguments, but, taken seriously, it is hard 
to imagine what alternative but abandoning judicial review of 
church and state would solve the dilemmas he poses.29 
Smith notes that we might keep judicial review but base it on 
something other than principle, such as history or tradition, but 
one wonders why courts would be any better equipped to con-
duct such a review than other citizens knowledgable about "his-
tory" and "tradition." Moreover, it is hard to take Smith 
seriously when he suggests keeping judicial review, but basing it 
on something other than principle. In fact, it is hard to imagine 
how any method of resolving debates concerning the proper rela-
tion between government and religion could avoid "degenerat-
ing" into an application of "principles" to the subject problems. 
Nor is the idea of using tradition and history to enlighten our 
perspective far removed from the notion of "precedent." 
Suppose, for example, we assigned juries of average citizens, 
unconstrained by the Constitution, the role of deciding whether 
and how given church-state problems should be solved. Could 
we seriously expect them to come to any resolutions without ap-
plying their own notions-i.e., principles-of what is just? If they 
looked to historical evidence of how past generations solved sim-
ilar problems, is that so very different from a court's application 
of precedent? And if we could not expect them to act in accord-
ance with their own notions of just principles and fair sense of 
the lessons of history, can it seriously be contended that such a 
system would advance religious liberty? We can speculate that 
the result would often be a form of majoritarianism incompatible 
with our history and tradition or, worse, religious persecution.3o 
Indeed, it might be said that the reason present church-state the-
29. A second irony in Foreordained Failure is the fact that, if Smith's arguments 
correctly suggest we should abandon judicial review of church and state, that result is, 
according to Smith's reading of history, just the result the framers would have desired. 
30. Cf. Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 15: 
Legislators are under no obligation to be principled. Subject only to their oath 
to uphold the Constitution, they are free to reflect majority prejudices, to re-
spond to the squeakiest wheel among minorities, to trade votes and make com-
promises, and to ignore problems that have no votes in them. This political 
freedom is good for many things, but it is not good for achieving even-handed 
tr~at~e.nt of many small, disparate, and sometimes odd or obnoxious religious 
mmontles: Judges are far from perfect, but they are sworn to do equal justice to 
all, to ~ec1de every case presented to them, and to treat like cases alike. They 
are obhged by precedent and accepted judicial norms to give principled reasons 
for their decisions. 
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ory has failed is precisely because courts have been too prag-
matic, too unprincipled, too ad hoc, and too majoritarian. 
Professor Smith does not address many of the questions left 
burning at the end of Foreordained Failure. He fails to say how 
he would resolve the interpretive problems created by his histori-
cal argument, and he elects to give only a brief discussion of the 
practical implications of his theoretical argument. Yet these are 
not tragic flaws in his effort. Smith's historical argument is 
powerfully presented, and he makes a valuable effort "to clarify 
our situation by trying to explore the nature and sources of our 
current confusion." (p. 121) Although Smith is wrong to suggest 
that the elusive nature of "neutrality" renders the process of the-
orizing about religious liberty hopeless, he nicely ferrets out and 
critiques the background assumptions that inform modern theo-
ries of religious freedom. His book is insightful, original, and 
foreordained to succeed. 
JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION. Edited by Warren F. 
Schwartz.t New York: Cambridge University Press. 1995. 
Pp. 246. Cloth, $49.95. 
Hiroshi Motomura2 
Immigration law reduces to a few basic but difficult ques-
tions. Should we restrict entry by outsiders? If so, what princi-
ples guide those restrictions? And after a newcomer arrives, 
when is she no longer a "newcomer," but one of "us"? These 
three questions are deceptively simple when so phrased, but they 
are the core issues of law and policy. We should keep them in 
sharp focus, the mind-numbing complexity of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act notwithstanding. 
We can answer these questions from different perspectives. 
One perspective involves policymaking through legislative and 
administrative processes. This is, of course, the staple diet of the 
Senate and House immigration subcommittees, as well as the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service, the Executive Office of 
Immigration Review, and other administrative bodies. Our three 
basic questions inform decisionmaking at this level, but inevita-
1. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
2. Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Colorado at Boulder. I would 
like to thank Linda Bosniak and Carol Lehman for their thoughtful comments on earlier 
drafts, and Hans-Joachim Cremer for guidance on matters of German law. 
